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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is an appeal from an Order and Final Judgment entered by the District Court, 
granting the City of Plummer's I.R.C.P. 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court 
dismissed Hayes' premises liability claims, ruling that Idaho's Recreational Use Statute, I.C. § 
36-1604, provided the City of Plummer with immunity because the City did not receive 
··compensation" or "charge'' for use of the land upon which Hayes was injured. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
This case arises from injuries sustained by Martin Hayes while attending his grandson's 
Pop Warner football game on September 17, 2011. On that date. Hayes was seriously injured 
when he stumbled and fell over a section of uneven ground hidden by grass on an athletic field 
owned by the City of Plummer ("City") and commonly known as Plummer School Park ('·School 
Park"). Hayes' injuries resulted in a fusion of his neck, permanent disability, and an inability to 
return to work. 
1. Ownership Of School Park 
The facts underlying the ownership and use of School Park are somewhat sordid. School 
Park is located at Block 45 of Plummer Township, adjacent to three buildings owned by the 
Plummer-Worley Joint School District ("School District"). Prior to October 1976, the School 
District (previously known as Western Benewah School District #42) owned and used School 
Park for its physical education programs. In 1976, the School District deeded School Park to the 
City so it could apply for a federal grant from the Land and Water Conservation Fund (L \VCF). 
[R. Vol. 1, pp. 72. 127. 137-138] 
The L WCF was established m 1965 to stimulate a nationwide program to assist m 
acquiring, developing, and preserving outdoor recreation resources for public use. [ R. Vol. I, p. 
1801 Projects eligible for assistance include sports playfields. [R. Vol. 1, p. 18./] The use of 
funded facilities may be coordinated for use by the general public and by public schools, and the 
school may have exclusive use of the facility, so long as there is adequate public access at other 
times. l R. Vol. 1, p. 189] Such coordination requires submission of a schedule of the times the 
facility is open to the public and associated public signage. [ R. Vol. 1, p. 189] In the Fall of 1976, 
School Park was deeded to the City and included in the City's request for federal funds. [ R. Vol. 
1. pp. 72, 137-138, 1./81 
In short, School Park was transferred to the City in 1976 for the sole purpose of obtaining 
a federal grant for improvements, which were not available if the School District continued to 
own it. 
2. Use And Maintenance Of School Park 
In connection with the transfer of ownership of School Park, the School District and the 
City entered into a Joint Service Agreement, (JSA), which allowed for the School District's 
continued use of the property, providing that the primary purpose of School Park would be for 
outdoor recreation by the general public when not being used for school activities. [ R. Vol. 1, p. 
130] The JSA also provided that the City would immediately construct certain facilities on the 
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property. and the School District would help maintain the site. !R. Vol. I, p. l 30] The JSA was 
to remain in effect in perpetuity. IR. Vol. I. pp. 130-131]. 
However, contrary to the terms of the JSA, in practice School Park has been used 
primarily by the School District and the City has not borne any degree of responsibility for the 
operation or maintenance of School Park since it received compensation from the L WCF in 
1976. [R. Vol. I, pp. 81, In 7-21; 82, ln 12-25; 83 ln 1-4; 97, ln 1-19; 101, ln 2-16] 
Following the transfer of title, federal funding, and execution of the JSA in 1976, the 
School District has continued to utilize School Park as its home football field. The School 
District pays for the electricity, lights, and water used at School Park, pays for all improvements, 
and maintains the property insurance for those improvements. [R. Vol. I, pp. , In 15-20; 78, In 
2-12; 79, In 3-7: 80, ln 3-18; 9 5, In 10-15 J The School District maintains the turf and grass, pays 
approximately $ 1.200 annually for fertilization, and performs any necessary maintenance. [ R. 
Vol. I. pp. 88. In 10-12; 89, In 1-10] In August 2013, the School District erected a new 
announcer box and bleachers at School Park at a cost of $104,000, which was paid for entirely 
by the School District. [ R. Vol. I, p. 79, In 18-2 fl The School District is also responsible for 
scheduling activities at School Park. [R. Vol. 1, pp. 75, In 1./-25; 76, In 1-16] The City has no 
involvement in the operation, maintenance, or scheduling of School Park whatsoever. [R. Vol. I, 
p. 97, ln 1-19] Other than use by the School District, School Park is not being used for public 
purposes. [R. Vol. I, pp. 83, ln 1-4; 101, In 2-16] 
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In sum, beyond the technical transfer of title to the City to obtain federal funding for 
improvements in 1976, the School District has continued to maintain and utilize School Park for 
non-public. school related activities. 
3. Hayes' Presence At School Park 
Pursuant to the terms of the JSA and the City's agreement with the L WCF, the School 
District was allowed exclusive use of School Park for scheduled activities. [R. Vol. 1, pp. 130, 
1./8, 189] The School District retained control and scheduling of organized activities, which 
required submission of a "Facilities Use Application". lR. Vol. 1, pp. 75, ln U-25; 76, ln 1-16; 
90, ln 16-25; 91, ln 1-12] On July 15, 2011, a Facilities Use Application was submitted to the 
School District for scheduled utilization of School Park by the local Pop Warner football 
program, and was approved by the necessary members of the School District. [ R. Vol. I, p. 105] 
It was during one of these scheduled football games on September 17, 2011 that Hayes was 
injured; Hayes did not pay an entrance fee. 
C. Course Of Proceedings Below. 
Hayes filed suit against the City, asserting a claim of premises liability. The City filed a 
motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Hayes' claims based upon the immunities 
provided by Idaho's Recreational Use Statute, I.C. §36-1604; that it did not receive 
··compensation," or ·'charge" for Hayes' entry upon the land. 
Hayes asserted that the School District's maintenance, payment of insurance and utilities, 
and scheduling of School Park constituted ··compensation" for its use of School Park, and that an 
issue of fact existed regarding whether Hayes' entry upon the land came within the scope of the 
School District's use. 
The District Court granted the City's motion, ruling that ··the costs of maintaining the 
park, which are paid by the school district, are not paid for entry into the park." A final 
judgment was entered dismissing Hayes' claims and this appeal followed. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that Plummer-Worley Joint School 
District's payment of all utilities, and provision all improvements, 
maintenance, and scheduling of ·'School Park'' did not constitute 
·'compensation" under Idaho' Recreational Use Statute, l.C. §36-1604. 
2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment, where issues 
of fact existed regarding whether Hayes entered School Park under the scope 
of Plummer-Worley Joint School District's permission and use. 
Ill. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court's grant of Summary Judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded for trial. The City is not entitled to immunity under the Recreational Use Statute 
because it received compensation for use of School Park from the School District in the form of 
utilities, improvements, insurance, and maintenance. 
The School District's use of the property included school activities, and scheduled 
organized events at School Park. It was during a School District-scheduled event that Hayes was 
present on the property and injured, giving rise to an issue of fact as to whether l layes entered 
the premises under the access granted to the School District at the time of his injury. 
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Accordingly, the School District compensated the City for its use of School Park, and 
l layes was injured during an event scheduled through the School District. These facts raise a 
genuine issue as to whether the City received "·compensation·' for Hayes' entry upon the 
property. As such, City is not entitled to immunity under LC. §36-1604, and is not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of la,v. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
The Supreme Court reviews a ruling on summary judgment under the same standard as 
the trial court. Gracie, LLC v. Idaho State Tax Com'n., 149 Idaho 570. 237 P.3d 1196 (2010). 
Summary judgment is proper ··if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits. if any. show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'' I.R.C.P. 56(c). Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law subject to free review. See Sanders v. Bd ofTrs. of'lvfountain 
llome Sch Dist. No. 193, 156 Idaho 269,272,322 P.3d 1002, 1005 (2014). The burden is on the 
movant, with all disputed facts and reasonable inferences being construed in favor of the non-
moving party. Castorena v. Gen. Elec .. 149 Idaho 609,613.238 P.3d 209,213 (2010). 
B. Analysis. 
The City asserts immunity under Idaho's Recreational Use Statute, LC. §36-1604. 
However, immunity under LC. §36-1604 is conditioned upon keeping the land open for public 
use without "charge" or ·'compensation". Because the City received compensation from the 
School District, it is not entitled to immunity for the School District's use of the School Park, 
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and issues of fact exist regarding whether Hayes entry upon the land came within the School 
District's use of School Park. 
part: 
Idaho Code Section 36-1604 governs the City's request for relief and provides in relevant 
36-1604. Limitation of liability of landowner. 
(a) Statement of Purpose. The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of 
land to make land, airstrips and water areas available to the public without charge 
for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering 
thereon for such purposes. 
(c) Owner Exempt from Warning. An owner of land owes no duty of care to 
keep the premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give any 
warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to 
persons entering for such purposes. Neither the installation of a sign or other form 
of warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity, nor any 
modification made for the purpose of improving the safety of others, nor the 
failure to maintain or keep in place any sign, other form of warning, or 
modification made to improve safety, shall create liability on the part of an owner 
of land where there is no other basis for such liability. 
(d) Owner Assumes No Liability. An owner of land or equipment who either 
directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use such 
property for recreational purposes does not thereby: 
1. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose. 
2. Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a 
duty of care is owed. 
3. Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or 
property caused by an act of omission of such persons. 
(g) Owner Not Required to Keep Land Safe. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to: 
3. Apply to any person or persons who for compensation permit the land to be 
used for recreational purposes. 
I.C. §36-1604. 
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LC. §36-1604 provides limited immunity to land owners who make property available to 
the public without charge or compensation for recreational purposes. The statute applies to 
public entities. including school districts. Ambrose By and Through Ambrose v. Buhl Joint 
School Dist.. 126 Idaho 581, 889 P.2d I 088 ( 1994 ). The statute defines --Recreational purposes'' 
to include "athletic competition ... when done without charge of the owner." I.C. §36-1604(b)(4). 
By its terms, the statute does not "apply to any person or persons who for compensation 
permit the land to be used for recreational purposes." I.C. §36-1604(g)(3). The language of the 
statute places the focus of the inquiry upon whether the landowner was compensated for use of 
the property; not upon who provided the compensation. As such. a landowner who does not 
charge or receive compensation for allowing recreational use of his property owes only the 
limited duty owed to trespassers. Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736 
( 1988). 
The statute does not define the terms ··charge" or "compensation," and no Idaho appellate 
court has yet addressed its interpretation. Allen v. State ex rel. Dep 't of Parks and Recreation, 
136 ldaho 487. 488, 36 P.3d 1275 (2001). The meaning of the term "charge" as used in I.C. § 
36-1604 was addressed by the Idaho federal court in Albertson v. Fremont County. Idaho, 834 F. 
Supp. 2d. 1117 (D. Idaho 2011 ). There, the court considered the holding in Allen, and discussed 
the reasoning of the trial court in Corey v. State, 108 Idaho 921, 703 P.2d 685 (1985), stating: 
..... There can be no doubt that the legislature intended the term ·charge' to mean a 
consideration given in return for the express and direct privilege of being allowed 
to utilize the property, in money or other thing of value." 
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Albertson, 834 F. Supp. 2d. at 1131 (quoting Corey v. State, Case No. 57158 (First Dist., 
Kootenai County, Mem. Opinion, May 23, 1984)). 
In analyzing Nevada's similar recreational use statute, the Ninth Circuit articulated the 
policy considerations underlying the interpretation and application of so-called "consideration 
exceptions" such as that crated by subsection (g)(3) of I.C. § 36-1604: 
The policy underlying the adoption of a consideration exception to the Nevada 
recreational use statute is to retain tort liability in actions involving recreational 
use of land where the use of the land for recreational purposes is granted not 
gratuitously but in return for an economic benefit.... [W]here a landowner 
derives an economic benefit from allo-wing others to use his land for 
recreational purposes, the landowner is in a position to post warnings, 
supervise activities, and otherwise seek to prevent injuries .... 
Ducey v. United S'tates, 713 F.2d 504, 510-511 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
Here, as discussed further below, LC. §36-1604 does not provide immunity for the City 
since the City received "compensation" from the School District in consideration for use of 
School Park and Hayes entered the premises within the scope of the School District's use. 
l. The School District's Maintenance, Payment Of Utilities, And 
Scheduling Of Events For School Park Constitutes A "Charge" 
And/Or "Compensation" Under I.C. §36-1604. 
The undisputed facts establish that the City received ·'compensation" from the School 
District for its use of School Park. As noted by the court in Albertson, the "legislature intended 
the term 'charge' to mean a consideration given in return for the express and direct privilege of 
being allowed to utilize the property, in money or other thing of value." Albertson, 834 F. Supp. 
2d. at 1131. 
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I Icre, the City does not dispute, and plainly admits, that it receives consideration from the 
School District for use of School Park. The School District pays for the lights, electricity, and 
water for School Park. [R. Vol. I, pp. 78, In 2-12; 95, ln 10-15] The School District spends 
approximately $1,200 annually on fertilizing School Park, and School District personnel waters, 
mows, and otherwise maintains and provides custodial care for the Park. IR. Vol. I. p. 89, In 1-
1 OJ The School District pays for all improvements to School Park, and carries property 
insurance on those improvements. [R. Vol. I, p. 80, ln 3-18] 
Additionally, the School District controls access to School Park and its use for organized 
activities, such as football games, requires scheduling through the School District. [ R. Vol. I, pp. 
In 14-25; 76, In 1-16; 97, In 1-7] As testified to by the I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) representative of the 
School District, Judi Sharrett: 
Q. Let me talk for a minute or ask for a minute about the use of this 
football field. Is it open to the public all the time? 
A. A person would have to -- or an organization would have to fill out a 
facility use form in order to be able to utilize that. 
Q. Okay. And that probably segues into the next question, and how was 
this -- well, describe this facility use form. \Vhat is it? 
A. \Veil, it's a -- if a -- if an activity needs to happen or if an organization 
or a private group wants to use something as -- that the school district 
utilizes -- you know, owns or utilizes -- and the football field would be 
one of those -- they would need to come in two weeks in advance and 
fill out a facility use agreement form and have to show proof of 
insurance and get permission to basically to look and see if the 
scheduling will work. 
Q. Okay. And how did that arrangement come to be? And this is kind 
of what I'm trying to figure out, the City owns the property, as you 
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stated, but then the school district is, for lack of a better term, 
scheduling things with it. 
A. During school time, yeah. 
Q. How about non-school hours? 
A. Well, yeah, we -- we do get -- do the scheduling for that too. 
[R. Vol. I, pp. 75, In 1-1-25; 76, In 1-16] 
In short, the City does not have uny role in School Park's, maintenance, scheduling, or 
access, and hasn't as far as the records indicate; those tasks are handled by the School District. 
[R. Vol. I, pp. 92, In 10-22; 97, In 1-19; 98 In 16-23; 99, In 15-24] 
Similarly, the JSA entered into between the City and the School District sets forth a 
bargained-for exchange under which the School District is granted use of School Park in 
exchange for taking on certain obligations. [R. Vol. I, pp. 130, 163-164] 
The fact that the City receives the benefits of these payments and services allows the 
Court to draw an obvious conclusion; that these in-kind benefits are given in consideration for 
the School District's use of School Park and constitute a ·'charge" or "compensation" under I.C. 
§36-1604. 
This conclusion finds support in the few cases addressing application of LC. §36-1604. 
Twohig v. U.S., 711 F. Supp. 560 (D. Mont. 1989) involved the death of a cross-country skier at 
a ski area operated by the U.S. Government. The Montana federal Court, interpreting I.C. §36-
1604. found that immunity did not extend to the United States Forest Service, which received 
ninety percent of a fee charged by the State of Idaho for a ·'Park-n-Ski" pass utilized to gain 
access to the ski area. The Twohig court reasoned that like the recreational use statutes of 
1 I 
California and Nevada, the policy underlying the adoption of a .. consideration exception'' like 
that found in LC. §36-1604 is to retain tort liability where the use of the land is granted not 
gratuitously, but in return for an economic benefit. Twohig, 711 F.Supp. at 563. ''[W]here a 
landowner derives an economic benefit from allowing others to use his land for recreational 
purposes, the landowner is in a position to post warnings, supervise activities, and otherwise seek 
to prevent injuries.'' Id. (quoting Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.1983 )) 
"[Here], the deposition testimony shows that the Forest Service has received economic 
benefits from the Park 'n' Ski program. A tangible economic benefit thereby inures to the 
government for permitting the land to be used for recreational purposes, and the consideration 
exception applies." Id. at 564. 
In Albertson v. Fremont County, Idaho, 834 F. Supp. 2d. 1117 (D. Idaho 2011 ), a 
snowmobiler was killed when he rode his snowmobile from a trail on national forest land onto a 
state highway and collided with a van. The Forest Service and Freemont County had an 
agreement to share the costs of maintaining the trail, and the decedent had paid the State of Idaho 
a $31.00 snowmobile numbering fee, 85% of which has remitted to Freemont County. 
In holding that the portion of the snowmobile registration fee designated to Freemont 
County did not constitute a "charge" for use of the trail system under I.C. §36-1604, the 
Albertson court adopted the reasoning of the trial court in Corey v. State, 108 Idaho 921, 703 
P.2d 685 (1985), holding that "the scheme for numbering snowmobiles has nothing to do at all 
with the land upon which the snowmobile might be operated." Albertson, 834 F. Supp. 2d. at 
1131. 
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Like the Forest Service in Twohig, here the undisputed facts demonstrate that the City 
received a direct economic benefit from the School District for its use of School Park. Pursuant 
to the JSA, and in practice, the School District provided all maintenance, improvements, and 
services for School Park in exchange for its use for school-scheduled activities. Moreover, 
unlike the registration fee paid in Albertson, here the economic benefits provided by the School 
District are directly related to the use of School Park. The Ninth Circuit's logic in Ducey is 
persuasive; for landowners who allow use of their land ·'not gratuitously but in return for an 
economic benefit... the further stimulus of tort immunity is both unnecessary and improper." 713 
F.2d at 510-11. 
Accordingly, the undisputed facts establish that the City is not entitled to immunity for 
the School District's use of School Park because it received "'compensation" from the School 
District. 
2. Hayes' Injury Occurred \Vithin The Scope Of The School 
District's Use Of School Park. 
The fact that the City received compensation from the School District for its use of 
School Park, combined with the School District's retention of control and scheduling of the 
football game at issue, raises an issue as to whether the City received compensation for Hayes' 
presence at School Park at the time of his injury. 
As discussed above, the City received compensation from the School District for its use 
of School Park. The question then becomes; what is the scope of the School District's use, and 
docs the event at which Hayes was injured fall within that scope? 
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Notwithstanding the City's ownership of School Park, the historical arrangement between 
it and the School District made School Park open for public use only when not being used by the 
School District. lR. Vol. I. p. 130] The City's I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) representative, Deborah 
Argelan, testified to School District's use of School Park as follows: 
Q. So my question to you is, Do you know how much of the use of 
Plummer School Park is open for recreational purposes versus school 
purposes? 
A. I --- I wouldn't have a figure for you, but as I am to understand it 
today, it is not used for public purposes that I am aware of. I - I'm 
sorry to be difficult here, but you're being slightly - you're not asking 
a direct question of me. The city currently has no scheduling of that 
park. So I'm to understand that the school is using it. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So if you want to refer to that as educational. Public use, there isn't 
any that I'm aware of. 
Q. The second thing I wanted to ask you about, Mike had some questions 
about education use versus recreational use. Same area but I'm going 
to ask it a bit different. Obviously, there's football games in the fall 
for high school and rec league, whatever. During the summer, is there 
any organized sports that are not tied to the school, like little league, 
baseball and soccer, things of that nature you're aware of! 
A. I am not aware of any. 
IR. Vol. I, pp. 101, In 2-16: 102, In 20-25: 103 ln 1-./] 
By resolution, the City had delegated certain duties, including the scheduling of activities 
at School Park during the school year, to the School District. [R. Vol. 1, pp. 163-16.,t] In practice, 
the School District scheduied all organized activities at School Park, education-related or not. 
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I. pp. '5. In J-1.-25: 76. In I-16; 82. ln 21 : 83. ln 1--1; 101 In 161 As testified to by 
the I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) representative of the City: 
Q. Does the - does the city govern access to the park at all? In other 
words, does the city operate as somebody who schedules activities at 
on the park? 
A. Not that I am aware of. 
Q. Who does that'? 
A. That would be the school district. 
Q. Okay. What does the city do with regard to the Plummer School 
Park? I mean, what role does it have in its operation and 
maintenance? 
A. It does not have a current role in its day-to-day operation. If you 
don't mind I would like to clarify. 
Q. Oh, please. 
A. Because we own the utilities, that would be the role that the city would 
have, if they had an issue with water or electric. But as far as that, the 
city has not operation of maintenance, schedule, access, there isn't 
any. 
[R. Vol. I, p. 95, In 1-19] 
Indeed, issues have historically arisen with the School District's exclusive use of School 
Park. In 1989. the Idaho Department of Parks and Recreation. ,vhich oversees projects funded 
through the L WCF, raised concerns that ··use is controlled by the school district." which was 
noted by the City; "the school was using the facilities exclusively for school activities". [ R. Vol. 
I. pp 160-161. 17-1] 
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I Iere, Hayes' injury occurred during a football game scheduled by and through the 
School District. By the City's own admission, the School District controls access to School 
Park, and the use of School Park for scheduled events requires that an application be submitted 
to, and approved by, the School District. lR. Vol. I, pp. 75, ln J../.-25; 7 6, In 1-16] 
On July 15, 2011, that application was submitted to the School District, which included 
games on Saturdays at 8 :00 a.m. 5 :00 p.m., 8/20/2011 - 10/8/2011. l R. Vol. I, p. I 05] Mr. 
Hayes was injured at School Park on Saturday, September 17. 2011 during one of these 
scheduled games. 
Accordingly, while the City alleges School Park is generally open for use to the public 
free of charge, the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that: 1) the City received compensation 
from the School District in exchange for its use of School Park; 2) the School District had 
exclusive control over access and the scheduling of organized events at School Park; and 3) 
Hayes' injury occurred during a football game scheduled through the School District. 
Accordingly, because the City was compensated by the School District for use of School 
Park. and because the School District governed the scheduling and access to School Park for the 
event at which Hayes was injured, issues of fact exist as to whether Hayes entered the premises 
under the access granted to the School District at the time of his injury. 
3. The Fact That Hayes Did Not Individually Pay To Use School 
Park Is Immaterial. 
The fact that Hayes did not pay a fee for entrance onto the land does not change the 
analysis. By its terms and underlying policy, an analysis of immunity under I.C. §36-1604 
16 
focuses upon whether the landowner charged or received compensation for use of the land; not 
whether it was the would-be plaintiff, or some other entity, who provided the compensation. 
More specifically, the statutory language itself places its focus on the landowner, not the user: 
The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land, 
airstrips and water areas available to the public without charge for recreational 
purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such 
purposes. 
I.C. §36-1604(a) (emphasis added). 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to: 
3. Apply to any person or persons who for compensation permit the land 
to be used for recreational purposes. 
l.C. §36-1604(g). 
'"Recreational purposes" includes ... "athletic competition . .. when done without 
charge of the owner." 
l.C. §36-1604(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, while Idaho courts have not directly addressed the issue, the Ninth Circuit and 
other courts interpreting the recreational use statute of Idaho and similar statutes of other 
jurisdictions have concluded that "consideration need not come from the ultimate user but it must 
be paid by someone so as to create access to the premises." Twohig, 711 F. Supp. at 564: see 
also Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 514 (9th Cir. 1983) (Nevada's recreational use statute 
does not require payment to come directly from ultimate user); Kantner v. Combustion 
Engineering, 701 F. Supp. 943, 948 (D.N.H. 1988); Ha/lacker v. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of' 
Gloucester, 806 F.2d 488, 492 (3rd. Cir. 1986 ). 
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Here. I !ayes did not pay a fee to enter School Park. Nor did he provide other 
compensation in exchange for his ability to use School Park. l Iowever, these facts are irrelevant 
the focus of the statutory inquiry is whether the landowner received compensation for access to 
the land. Here the School District's control, scheduling, and in-kind contributions created the 
access utilized by Hayes at the time of his injury. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law. the City received compensation from the School District in the form 
of utilities and maintenance in exchange for the School District's use of the property. The 
School District scheduled the event at which Hayes was injured, and issues of fact exist as to 
whether Hayes entered the premises under that authority. The District Court's Order Granting 
Summary Judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for trial to determine whether 
Hayes entered the land within the scope of the School District's use, which would obviate the 
City's immunity under LC. §36-1604. 
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